De-limitations. Of Other Earths by Tusa, Giovanbattista
166
© EUSP, 2020. ISSN 2310-3817. Vol. 9. No. 1. p. 166–183
De-limita-tions. Of Other Earths
Giovanbattista Tusa
Researcher in Philosophy and Ecology
Nova Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA),
Universidade Nova, Av. de Berna, 26, 1069–061 Lisbon, Portugal
E-mail: giovannitusa@fcsh.unl.pt
De-limitations. Of Other  
Earths
Abstract:
In my essay I will explore the geophilosophical possibility of 
rethinking the figure of the earth in twentieth-century Western 
philosophical thought and suggest new opportunities for thinking 
that open up with the twenty-first century. On the one hand, 
“Earth” as a Western concept has been reduced to an exhaustible 
resource — an endangered planet condemned to its own ending. 
On the other hand, another continent seems to have emerged in 
contemporary philosophical thought in reaction to this brutal 
relationship with the planet — “Earth” as a dark, impenetrable 
and indestructible reserve, the last resource of thought. 
A materialization of an unconditional power, this Earth seems 
to reproduce the original need for a wild, ultimate refuge for the 
philosophical thought of the twentieth century. To this archaic 
Earth of thought, whose survival seems to depend on preserving 
itself untouched, and untouchable, I confront another possibility, 
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As of November 1, 2018, there are 3,874 con-
firmed exo-planets in 2,892  systems, with 
638  systems having more than one planet. 
All were discovered since 1992 — a few just 
before Gilles Deleuze’s suicide in 1995. 
Note 85, Benjamin H. Bratton, 
The Terraforming
1.
In one of the notes from his fragmentary and unfinished work on 
cultural apocalypse  — published posthumously under the title La fine 
del mondo (The end of the world) — Italian anthropologist Ernesto 
De Martino describes an ancient Roman ritual designated by the 
expression mundus patet: “the world is open” (De Martino 2002: 11).
The mundus was a pit that opened three times a year to bring the 
dead back to Earth. According to De Martino’s reconstruction, the 
days during which the mundus remained open were considered to be 
calamitous and it was imperative to abstain from any kind of human 
activity. “Not only was it prohibited to engage in battle during those 
days,” as Latin grammarian and philosopher Macrobius recounted 
in his Saturnalia, “but also to recruit armies and send them to war, 
weigh anchor, or take a wife.” 1 Through the mundus, the earth of the 
living was open and permeable to the realm of the dead, exposed to 
chaos. However, once these nefarious days were over, daily life could 
resume normally. “The ritual of the mundus,” writes the author of 
La fine del mondo, evokes “the risk of an end of the world crisis, ex-
orcising and containing it through the limitation, in time and space, 
of the return of the dead and the end of all human cultural activity” 
(Ibid: 11). The “cultural apocalypse” is defined as the “risk of not 
being able to exist in any possible cultural world.” While “the end of 
‘a’ world,” says De Martino in his epilogue, remains “in the order of 
human cultural history, it is the end of ‘the’ world, as the ultimate 
experience of the end of any possible world, which constitutes the 
most radical risk” (Ibid: 630).
From his early research on the magical rituals of southern Italy, 
De Martino investigated the existence of a “magical world,” wherein 
1 Macrobius (2011: Saturnalia 1, 18).
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presence in the world is neither certain nor guaranteed, but rath-
er always exposed to the risk of transience and annihilation, to 
the danger of losing one’s soul and no longer being there. “Being 
there,” as De Martino reflects, becomes a “having to be there” whose 
horizon is marked by a dynamic and socially constructed limit, in 
constant need of being recovered. In the magical world, presence is 
something uncertain that has to be continually restored, for behind 
the risk of losing the soul lies the other, greater risk of losing the 
world. In this disintegration of reality, magic is the power to restore 
to human beings the world that is being lost:
To the representation and experience of a soul that escapes from 
its proper place, that is endangered, fragilized, subtracted, stolen, 
etc., corresponds the representation and experience of objects that 
go beyond their sensitive horizon, withdrawing from their limits, and 
precipitating into chaos. When a certain sensitive horizon enters into 
crisis, the risk lies in fact in the collapse of every limit: everything can 
become everything else, which is to say: nothingness advances. But 
magic, in a way that reveals the risk, intervenes at the same time to end 
the insurgent chaos, to redeem it into an order. (De Martino 2010: 123)
Through the ritual of mundus, Roman civilization was able to face 
and exorcise the risk of a chaotic end of the world, that is, of the 
city, its inhabitants, its culture. It did so by representing this threat 
with the periodic return of the dead, and by controlling it through 
a communitarian exorcism. This exorcism fixes spatially and tempo-
rally within a symbolic place and an iterative time, both the risk of 
the end and the cultural response to it — namely its foundation and 
recommencement. The apocalypse begins when putting things back 
in order becomes impossible — when not only this world becomes 
impracticable, but when worldliness itself — what allows humans to 
make a world — disappears.
Delimiting the end — giving it a determined meaning as annihi-
lation, solution, liquidation — leads to alienation, which is experi-
enced as a lack of signification. The experience of the immundus 
is felt as the devastating evidence of non-sense. This relationship 
of separateness indicates a relationship deficit, wherein the bond 
is only experienced as missing, or meaningless. As Rahel Jaeggi 
remarks, Marx describes alienation “in terms of the ‘double loss of 
reality’ of the world and the human being: having become unreal, 
the individual fails to experience herself as ‘effective,’ and the world, 
having become unreal, is meaningless and indifferent” (Jaeggi 2014: 
6). Alienation, Jaeggi concludes, turns out to be a deficient relation-
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ship with oneself, with the world, and with others, which gener-
ates relationships of impotence, isolation, and instrumentalization.
Reconfiguring the concept of alienation, Anna L. Tsing (2015) re-
minds us how alienation consists of disconnecting the thing from 
its general social world — a necessary step for the transformation of 
natural resources into accumulable commodities. Through alien-
ation, people and things become moving commodities; they can be 
removed from their living environments and transported in order to 
be exchanged for other commodities from different worlds. Alien-
ation generates a mutation in the landscape: all that counts is only 
one commodity, separated from all the rest; everything else becomes 
wasteland, refuse, desolation (Ibid). Alienation is then a condition of 
life that is governed by an extractivist model, transforming our living 
environments into all kinds of plantations on the verge of becoming 
uninhabitable. “Plantations kill off beings that are not recognized as 
assets,” writes Tsing, “they also sponsor new ecologies of proliferation, 
the unmanageable spread of plantation-augmented life in the form 
of disease and pollution” (Tsing 2017: 52).2 For Tsing it is evident 
that capitalism cannot proliferate without this process of contin-
uous expropriation of the conditions of existence of the existent.
As Hannah Arendt emphasizes, it is “world alienation, and not 
self-alienation as Marx thought [that] has been the hallmark of the 
modem age” (Arendt 1958: 254). Starting from Descartes — this is 
Arendt’s idea — we see the development of an exclusive concern 
with the self “as distinguished from the soul or person or man in 
general, an attempt to reduce all experiences, with the world as well 
as with other human beings, to experiences between man and him-
self” (Arendt 1958: 254). The condition of world deprivation — the 
acosmia — is characterized by a terrifying atrophy of all the organs 
through which we share a world with others. Hence, according to Ar-
endt, expropriation and world alienation coincide, and “the modern 
age began by alienating certain strata of the population from the 
world” (Ibid: 253). This acosmia, concludes Arendt, was accompanied 
by a revolutionary mutation of the capacity to transform our envi-
ronment that led to alienation from nature as a specific dimension 
of Earth alienation (Arendt 1958: 264–65).
The conversion of the earth into matter and energy is the ba-
sic figure of a transformational project, which has its fundamental 
raison d’être in the fabrication of the separation between a plastic, 
2 On the logic of the plantation as a monotonous and deadly thought of a unilat-
eral future assigned to a single variety optimized within a predictable growth curve, 
see Sowing Empire Landscape and Colonization by Jill H. Casid (2004), and Plantation 
Memories: Episodes of Everyday Racism by Grada Kilomba (2008).
170
Giovanbattista Tusa
demiurgic humanity and an earth reduced to an object of demoli-
tion and depredation. The fundamental project of this era wherein 
human beings seem to have become a geomorphic agent — wherein, 
consequently, the difference between organic and inorganic, as well 
as between dead and living, seems to have collapsed — was captured 
by Achille Mbembe (2020) with the architectural term “Brutalism.” 
Mbembe uses this expression or thought image to describe an epoch 
“caught in the pathos of demolition and production, on a planetary 
scale, of reserves of darkness. And waste of all kinds, residues, traces 
of a gigantic demiurgy” (Ibid: 8–9).
2.
From his seminars in the 1930s to his latest texts, Heidegger de-
plored the “worldlessness” and “disorientation” caused by modern 
technological man, insofar as the latter conceives his relationship 
with reality first and foremost in terms of calculation, exploitation, 
and planning. For Heidegger, a new relationship with the earth is 
established in modernity: one which does not simply consist of a pro-
ductive system that “intensifies” natural production in order to direct 
it to human needs or requirements, but which also reduces all natural 
processes to a pure and simple accumulation of available, usable, 
and consumable resources. If the Greek technē is still connected to 
poiesis, understood as bringing forth (Hervorbringen), modern tech-
nology could be rather defined as Gestell: an “enframing” apparatus, 
for which all beings become standing reserves (Bestand).3
One of the most interesting of Heidegger’s contributions is un-
doubtedly his speculation that the earth has never been authenti-
cally thought of in the history of metaphysics. By exhausting all the 
determinations of metaphysics, by totalizing and absolutizing them, 
the Gestell produced an earthless world, provided that by “earth” we 
mean a non-disposable ground, irreducible to calculation, an unob-
jectifiable limit. If the technological dimension can be destructive 
for the earth and uprooting for the Dasein, it does not occur for 
essential or structural reasons intrinsic to the “technological”, as 
such. Rather, Gestell “means that way of revealing which holds sway 
3  In a letter sent to Kojima Takehiko on September 2, 1963, Heidegger tries to 
determine the strange, unsettling origin of the overpowering domination of natu-
ral elements at the heart of the age of modern technology. In this age, Heidegger 
explains, “the buried energy is released, what is released is transformed, the trans-
formed is amplified, the amplified is stored and what is stored is distributed”. The 
correspondence between Heidegger and Kojima is published in the volume Japan und 
Heidegger, edited by Harmut Buchner (1989: 222).
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in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing 
technological” (Heidegger 1977: 20).
Yet, for Heidegger, this disastrous process of the metaphysical 
destruction of the earth should not be avoided but brought instead 
to its end. The end of this age would only come about if its own 
logic is pushed to the catastrophic point of its reversal. In his short 
text “Overcoming Metaphysics,” he argues that the devastation 
of the earth must be carried out to the fullest extent so that its 
oblivion could no longer remain eclipsed.4 Only an unprecedented 
violence, which can represent the absolute completion of Western 
civilization, can destroy the self-destruction that is at work in 
the destructiveness of the Western project. Destruction must be 
destroyed. This destruction of destructiveness, according to Heide-
gger, will allow the emergence, under the sedimentary strata and 
structures of the metaphysical thought, of the unthought.
In 1946, the year after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki, Heidegger composed “Wozu Dichter?” (2001), a short text in 
which he proposes — in an intriguing contradiction with what he had 
written a few years earlier in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphys-
ics (1995) — a peculiar reading of Rainer Maria Rilke’s poems which 
disrupts the idea of the hierarchical order of beings. “Man on the 
one hand, plant and beast on the other” are delivered to a common 
dimension which Heidegger calls das Offene (the Open), “what is 
closed up, unlightened, which draws on in boundlessness” (Heidegger 
2001: 104): they are thrown in the “worldly” event of an opening. 
Heidegger distinguishes the “worldly” (das Weltische) as the event of 
an opening — of the world and to the world — from “the world” as the 
totality of beings which modern man, as a rational being, confronts. 
The “worldly” opening of nature — as opposed to the imperialism of 
the calculating reason applied to all phenomena — supposes that all 
beings partake in the “venture” of the event of being (Ibid: 99).
Confronted with the outbreak of the overwhelming power of be-
ings, Heidegger meditates on the dimension of withdrawal as the 
most intimate heart of the Open. If reason in “the atomic age” is 
characterized by the fact that “the power of the mighty Principle, 
of the principium reddendae rationis […], threatens everything of hu-
mans being-at-home and robs them of the roots of their subsistence” 
(Heidegger 1996: 30), then a new ground is necessary for philosophy: 
a ground that is not a cause nor a principle.
4 “Before Being can occur in its primal truth, Being as the will must be broken, 
the world must be forced to collapse and the earth must be driven to desolation, and 
man to mere labour. […] In the decline, everything, that is, beings in the whole of 
the truth of metaphysics, approaches its end” (Heidegger 2003: 86).
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In the summer seminar of 1943, Heidegger focuses his attention on 
the remaining fragments from the treatise by the Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus commonly known as “Peri Physeos” (traditionally trans-
lated as On Nature), which the philosopher of Meßkirch chooses to 
translate with the expression “On Emerging” (Heidegger 2018: 83). 
Modern natural science, according to Heidegger, explains how some-
thing closed emerges and, as emerging, comes forth as “a chemical 
process that is interpolated in terms of the grinding gears of the 
mechanistically viewed interaction between seeds, the condition of 
the soil, and thermal radiation” (Ibid: 67). Heidegger points out that 
this understanding of natural processes of germination and inception 
has nothing to do with the primordial sense of physis. Physis is not 
“nature,” but the original Greek name for the blossoming of Being 
from its withdrawal, which does not occur “in the manner of some-
thing that appears: rather, it is the inconspicuous in all appearing 
things” (Ibid: 109)
Physis “lights up that on which man bases his dwelling. We call 
this the earth” — Heidegger writes in the “The Origin of the Work of 
Art” (2002: 21). For philosophy in the age of devastation, “Earth” 
designates the concealed, nocturnal growth in physis: it becomes, 
in Heidegger’s writings, the unique thought of a non-foundational 
ground. It is not an archaic element that precedes all others, but 
that which rather traverses them all, without prevailing over them. 
When the earth lies in oblivion, the violence of beings is unleashed 
without measure as pure potential of omnipotence and destruction, 
in total forgetfulness that there is, as poet Paul Celan says, “earth 
within them” (1972: 66). The earth in a sense has a paradoxical 
existence: it shows itself — Heidegger concludes — “only when it re-
mains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth shatters every attempt 
to penetrate it. It turns every merely calculational intrusion into an 
act of destruction” (Heidegger 2002: 25).
Famously for Heidegger, the global view of Earth from the out-
side as an errant planet suggests complete interconnectedness and 
coexistence, but it also generates the extreme danger of totalitarian 
control. Imagining the earth as one totality is, then, the result of 
a technological vision that accompanied and fulfilled what he had 
defined as “metaphysics,” and it neutralizes any dynamics which 
may start another history. In this sense, he has often presented in 
his writings the unilateral development of Western globalization by 
referring to the “planetary” as the final scene of this process, the end 
of the Western world encountering its own catastrophe. If modernity 
has been defined by the construction of a multiple outside or exterior, 
its final colonization of outer space produces an ultimate, self-con-
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tained planetary interior. To Heidegger, what appears in the Gestell 
is “the sameness of being, beings, and essence” (Malabou 2011: 168); 
and in the reign of the Same, the Other is condemned to disappear.
Yuk Hui remarks that Heidegger always assumed that there exist-
ed “only a single homogenous Machenschaft after the Greek technē, 
one that is calculable, international, even planetary” (Hui 2017). But 
if the “globe” is an abstraction — the product of a territorial vision 
that has become a universalizing metaphysical vision — the “planet” 
could be imagined, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak suggests, “in the 
species of alterity, belonging to another system” (2014: 1223). From 
this perspective, planetarity relationalizes “non-interchangeable 
entities and thus allow[s] for […] the aesthetically immeasurable” 
(Moraru 2015: 220), offering a different figure “for the collapse of 
the totality of globes and globality” (Gabrys 2018). The purpose of 
thinking in a planetary perspective is not that of abandoning the 
earth, or evacuating it to return it to its sidereal errancy, but rather 
to conceive its planetary dimension as an inexhaustible diversity of 
different cosmotechnics, and epistemes, “to overcome modernity 
without falling back into war and fascism” (Hui 2017).
3.
In the “Anthropocene,” with all the ambiguity that such a term 
entails, what was considered separate now appears to be connected 
in a common temporal destiny, or at least in an inevitable colli-
sion. A new narrative is inscribed in the strata of the earth, based 
on a material evolution that integrates the origin of humanity no 
longer only in a biological context but also in a geological one.5 The 
collision of human and nonhuman spheres — paradoxically linked by 
immeasurable relationships, rather than by the regime of equiva-
lence characterizing capitalist exchange — opens thought and action 
to a scale that escapes any pre-stabilized sense.
Bruno Latour (1993) claims that the planetary environmental 
crisis is the most striking evidence of the unreality of the regime 
of separation between nature and politics, which is at the basis of 
5 It is necessary, however, to underline the contradictions as well as the promises 
of a new “alliance” between man and earth, bearing in mind that geology enabled 
and accompanied an imperialist logic, which implemented the mining regime that 
followed the discovery of the Americas (a regime structurally linked to slavery as 
its own condition of possibility). In A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None, Kathryn 
Yusoff points out that geology was historically configured as a classificatory science, 
which made possible the formation of the “inhuman materialism” that empowered 
the “racializing logics that maps onto and locks into the formation of extractable 
territories and subjects” (2018: 83).
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modernity, and it reveals the failure of the cosmopolitical govern-
ment (nomos) of the Moderns. This failure would thus force us to 
change our reference system and to abandon the strictly human 
perspective in favor of an intertwinement of ontologically insepa-
rable humans and non-humans. Nevertheless, we have to highlight 
that in the Anthropocene the increasing threat of the end of the 
human world is the ultimate consequence of human domination 
over the world. In this sense, the Anthropocene entails a humanistic 
approach to man’s relationship with nature, illustrated by the linear 
and autonomous story of a species that evolved from hunter-gather-
er tribes to global geological force. Its universalist dimension could 
be easily recognized, as Anselm Franke wrote recently, in “the per-
manent invocation of the largest possible frames (the entire world), 
which refuses to be identified as such because it simply no longer 
recognizes any outside, any otherness,” as it is at once “without 
alternative and ‘open’ to any form of otherness. The negation of the 
frame is the biggest frame” (2013: 16).
Rather, according to Déborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro (2017), what we need to undermine is the very concept of 
anthropos as a universal subject, capable of acting as one species. 
If the world appears to be on the edge of extinction, it is because 
we are facing an unimaginable future from the perspective of our 
present. Until now, philosophy seemed to know not only what kind 
of entity anthropos is, but also who is talking when one says “we.” 
But for the two Brazilian authors the expression “end of the world” 
has a certain meaning only if it is established for whom this ending 
world is a world, that is “who is the worldly or ‘worlded’ being who 
defines the end” (Ibid: 20). If there is not only one single end of 
the world, then the origins of humanity are also multiple: the end 
of the human world questions where the “human” begins. Danowski 
and Viveiros de Castro propose a “fractal” understanding of the end, 
whereby they mean the fracturing of the myth of a unique end, as 
well as of a shared origin of the human being (Ibid: 105).
The earth, from this perspective, cannot be placed before us as an 
object of knowledge or appropriation, it is instead the irreplaceable 
event that we would not know how to create or construct, whose 
extension cannot be calculated, because it is not determinable. In 
this sense, the earth is neither a body or a cosmomorphic entity, nor 
a domain or a home, but rather a contingent multitude of relation-
ships, an unconstructable historical trajectory that “traverses the 
living and the non-living, the non-conscious mineral and the diverse 
levels of the consciousness of the living […] [and which] bears and 
carries within itself the multiplicity of forms of human and nonhu-
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man existence that have appeared not on Earth but with the Earth” 
(Neyrat 2018: 171–72). Humans might leave some traces of their 
passage on it, but ultimately, the earth would always remain distinct 
from its inhabitants. No longer stabilized in the reassuring image of 
the mother-house favorable to life (the habitat, described by Hannah 
Arendt in The Human Condition, wherein earthly human beings can 
move and breathe without effort and without artifice), it emerges 
instead as a vast, unlimited set of limitations and bonds, as a sort 
of unconditional chain of constraints between beings and realms.
The idea of the transformation of the earth understood as ex-
traction of energy or ravaging and manipulation of brute matter col-
lapses when existence itself is seen as the ongoing metamorphosis of 
impersonal material conditions, as an effect of contingent influences 
that cannot be reduced to the idea of design in a constructivist 
sense. In The Life of Plants, Emanuele Coccia mentions Darwin’s 
last book, pointing out how the action of worms is decisive “for the 
disaggregation of rocks, the erosion of the soil, the conservation of 
ancient ruins, and the soil’s preparation for the growth of plants” 
(Coccia 2019: 42). Worms, although incapable of grasping the other 
strata outside their world, generate structural transformations on 
the earth’s level that go far beyond any possible construction, in-
tention, or project. In this sense, as the author of The Life of Plants 
writes, the world is the space that “never lets itself be reduced to 
a house, to what is one’s own, to one’s digs, to the immediate” 
(Ibid: 43). Far from being our space, the world is ultimately always 
the space of others, a space of negotiations — in brief: a space of 
political relations, provided we assume that “political” (in its irre-
ducible multiplicity or politeia) refers to what collapses the sensible 
configuration in which the positions between the one who exercises 
power and the one subjected to it are already configured, and the 
roles already defined and assigned (Rancière 2004).
Reconsidering the relational and non-substantial nature of ac-
tion, we must assume the fundamental distributedness of thinking 
and of its capacity for transformation. In his Métaphysiques cos-
morphes (2015), Pierre Montebello sustains that cognition is not 
an extraterrestrial event; it rather reflects passages, transforma-
tions, deformations, captures, participations, possessions, coloni-
zations. The real is relational for Montebello, cognition can thus 
only be a relation within relations. Rethinking the earth opens up 
a dimension in philosophy that is irreducibly material but never 
substantial: it gives to philosophy a site for thinking of a plural-





If the twentieth century has long explored the possibility of 
a tabula rasa, a purifying epitome (Badiou 2007), the twenty-first 
century seems to open with a sense of exhaustion, of depletion of 
resources, of decrease in the forces. This interpretation of actuality 
as a progressive attenuation of an initial, primal, uncontaminated 
energy is accompanied by a specific idea of limit and consequently 
of rationality and “world.” As Michael Marder observes in his Ener-
gy Dreams (2017), the concept of “end” as an achievable objective 
or a sudden cessation “foreign to the consummation of movement 
and the satisfaction of rest” should be ascribed to an impover-
ished and arbitrary sense of limit, conceived as “a razor-sharp edge 
where a spatial surface or a temporal line abruptly drops, rather 
than a boundary or a border, for instance, between motley worlds” 
(Ibid: 116). Furthermore, the figure of the “end” as exhaustion of 
a given energy, mechanically doomed to extinction, has generated 
a consequent ideology of sustainability, which resulted in an image 
of the planet as a closed system, “a laboratory of checks and bal-
ance, birth and decay, predator and prey, creation and destruction” 
(Boetzkes 2019: 8).
Bernard Stiegler describes our age as an “age of disruption,” which 
radicalizes innovation to such an extent that it “prevents any meta-
stabilization with the other systems that constitute the social body” 
through the “creation of legal and theoretical vacuums” (2018: 105). 
Be that as it may, it is evident that the orientation of contemporary 
economic reason is to suppress some of the arbitrary excesses of 
the capitalist system by turning it into an adaptive process that is 
constantly updated on the basis of data concerning the allocation of 
specific resources. This development model seems to reproduce the 
natural cycles of activity and stoppages of an organism, whereby ex-
ploitation would become, so to speak, “natural,” working according 
to a rhythm of scarcity and abundance. The general determination 
of the energy circulating in the planet would therefore be deter-
mined by ends, requiring a concurrent accumulation to guarantee 
a “sustainable” future, economically defined.
Georges Bataille’s The Notion of Expenditure (1997) is a proposal 
for the liberation from capitalistic accumulation as the underlying 
foundation of the planetary order, an attempt to mobilize the eman-
cipatory momentum of a thought that seeks to recuperate the notion 
of “energy” from the notions of economy and economic stock. Identi-
fying the crucial disconnection between economics — the production 
and use of wealth — and the circulation and exchange of energy that 
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constantly ex-orbits earthly human activities, Bataille remarks that 
life cannot in any way be limited to the closed systems assigned to it 
by economically organized, sustainable systems. Rather, in his view, 
“the immense travail of recklessness, discharge and upheaval that 
constitutes life could be expressed by stating that life starts only with 
the deficit of these systems” (Ibid: 180). It is only through insubordi-
nation to the logic of utility, “when the ordered and reserved forces 
liberate and lose themselves for ends that cannot be subordinated to 
anything one can account,” that human beings cease “to be isolated 
in the unconditional splendor of material things” (Ibid: 180). Only 
then are they able to regain “an intimacy that was always strangely 
lost (Bataille 1988: 129). The intimacy of which Bataille is speaking 
has nothing authentic about it — it is not a “self-sufficient” sphere 
of autonomy; on the contrary, it opens up the possibility of a polit-
ical relationship that goes beyond intersubjective exchange, beyond 
the capitalist preservation of forces in view of a foreseeable future. 
It opens up the multiple truth of an energetical ethos that does not 
produce any know-how and cannot be constructed as a knowledge 
based on the thought of means and ends, of instruments and produc-
tions, of principles and consequences — hence exposed to the streams 
of energies that come and go, with no other consistency than the 
insistence of this coming and going.
However, the model proposed by Bataille seems to imply a vital 
need for every organism to receive, process, and accumulate en-
ergy from the outside. It assumes economic structures as much as 
natural givens in a state of equilibrium or imbalance, which dis-
charge at a certain point a radically heterogeneous energy against 
said economic structures in the inassimilable form of destructive 
events. Hence, it somehow naturalizes the creation of surplus value, 
assimilating it to a cosmic phenomenon rather than to a product of 
specific forms of exploitation. A modern form of heliocentrism, this 
exogenous vitalism maintains, according to Reza Negarestani, the 
monogamous model of the relation between terrestrial life and the 
sun, it is a “solar” capitalism in “line with the vitalistically pluralist 
and thanatropically monist regime of solar economy.” According to 
this model, the earth “can be reinvented and recomposed only as 
a new planet or slave of the Sun whose life and death are emphatically 
determined by its star or exorbitant source of energy” (Negarestani 
2010: 6). To emancipate from this “heliocentric slavery,” Negarestani 
proposes to embrace “perishability” and the erratic temporality of 
cosmic energies into terrestrial thought, for “terrestrial thought and 
creativity must essentially be associated with ecology, but an ecology 
that is based on the unilateral powers of cosmic contingencies such as 
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climate changes, singularity drives, chemical eruptions and material 
disintegration” (Ibid: 8). Cosmic contingencies are immanent more 
to the inside of the system than to its outside: they actively mobilize 
the interiorized horizon of life. Assuming plurality in modes of life 
beyond the conservative and economical nature of the organism does 
not deny the role of living creatures in planetary existence, but it 
rather expresses “an agnostic attitude towards the organic/inorganic 
status of the entities inhabiting the planet” (Likavčan 2019).
Karen Barad proposes an “Agential Realism,” which negates the ex-
istence of previously existing isolated entities, and defines phenom-
ena as “relations without pre-existing relata.” Barad contends that 
the “boundaries and properties of the components of phenomena be-
come determinate” and “material articulations of the world become 
meaningful” through “specific agential intra-actions” (2007: 139). 
These occur within phenomena, and not through interaction, which 
occurs between phenomena, and assumes that entities are already 
clearly defined and separated. Drawing on Niels Bohr’s interpretation 
of quantum physics, Barad claims that the foundational reductionist 
essentialism of particles needs to be radically deconstructed:
Ontological indeterminacy, a radical openness, an infinity of possi-
bilities, is at the core of mattering […] Closure can’t be secured when 
the conditions of im/possibilities and lived indeterminacies are inte-
gral, not supplementary, to what matter is. Nothingness is not absence, 
but the infinite plenitude of openness. Infinity and nothingness are 
not the termination points defining a line. Infinity and nothingness 
are infinitely threaded through one another so that every infinitesi-
mal bit of one always already contains the other. The possibilities for 
justice-to-come reside in every morsel of finitude (Barad 2012: 16–17).
Ontological indeterminacy extends the possibility of birth and 
death beyond the animate world and living beings. To see the earth as 
non-organic, as a force for the disorganization of life, is to recognize 
that planetary dynamics emerge from contingent agencies where 
life could be seen as a moment in the greater dynamic unfolding of 
what is not life. “Nonlife,” Elisabeth Povinelli claims in Geontologies, 
“is what holds, or should hold for us, the more radical potential. For 
Nonlife created what it is radically not, Life” (2016: 176).
The multitude of planetary compositions shows that life always 
has the possibility of organizing itself without confining itself. Rather 
than being driven by an internal force, life then seems to be energized 
by a sensible experience of alteration, by an elemental aesthesis that 
surpasses any organic organization. Rethinking the contingent insep-
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arability of planetary relations cannot therefore be reduced to a rad-
ical organicism, to a poetic fusion with the earth. Thought, together 
with the relation to external circumstances, must also cultivate its 
capacity for detachment, for making the difference. Being a radical 
discontinuity, and at the same time a persistent force, thought re-
quires the embracement of foreign materials: it is not the resource 
of a substance, rather it is enhanced from further alienation. Its 
actualization does not exhaust its potential but rather increases it.
The prefix “geo-“ in “geophilosophy,” wrote Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, indicates the “constitutive relationship of philosophy 
with nonphilosophy,” the necessity for nonphilosophy to “become 
the earth and people of philosophy” (1994: 110). The prefix does 
not indicate any precedence, or antecedence, but rather an imma-
nent resistance to the exhaustion of philosophy, it reveals “that 
objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder” 
(Adorno 1973: 5), that nonidentity is a presence that acts upon 
us. “Geo-“ calls philosophy to a revolution “that entails a mode of 
thinking capable of germinating its viewpoints along lines of com-
plicity between antagonistic or incommensurable fronts” (Negar-
estani 2011:52).
5.
Modern Earth, characterized as a combination of natural resourc-
es, fertile soils, building materials, territories to occupy, has had its 
own possibility to exist only in its constitutive relationship with the 
corresponding emergence of multiple Terrae Nullius. These were 
specifically designated lands, which were not exploited by their in-
habitants, and which could be therefore appropriated by colonizers 
and invaders from foreign worlds. The earth became in this way the 
traditional foundation of the right of property exploitation. But at 
the same time, as a complementary response to the abstract vio-
lence of this movement of territorialization, the earth has become 
the figure that embodies an extreme point, the innermost part, 
that which constitutes the ultimate background, that which stands 
behind or underneath, the fundus of thought itself. Consequently, 
geological dynamism, morphogenesis, and glaciology have become 
a poetic reserve capable of altering the perception of time, space, 
and human actions, allowing a new Earth to emerge, untouched by 
the abstract logics of economic trans-actions. Because of its dense 
superficiality, in interactive contact with other states of matter, 
this new Earth becomes the privileged threshold to reach, the shock 
point between different conditions of knowledge.
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This philosophical Earth, which represents what exceeds all 
possessions, in its unfathomable dimension of depth, density and 
impenetrability, seems to reproduce — via negative — what we have 
witnessed as the trend of modernity: to make the implicit explicit, 
to illuminate what remained in the dark, to reveal what was hidden, 
to bring the latent out of its retreat, to display the background. 
Similarly, we could say that Western philosophy during the last 
century attempted to conceive the unrepresentable, to think a ca-
tastrophe that the reason of the epoch was unable to understand, 
and to maintain this unrepresentable at the heart of thought. “After 
Auschwitz,” philosophy derives its power to think from the unthink-
able, from that which resists any dialectical assimilation. It was able 
to convert, wrote Jacques Rancière, “the ‘impossibility’ of art after 
Auschwitz into an art of the unpresentable” (2007: 134). Thus, phi-
losophy feeds on the expectation that the earth could be the figure 
of the inexpressible itself — the perennially neglected part, which is 
never expressed in form, the obscure reserve of the sayable and the 
visible. Earth is, in this sense, the undiscovered continent, which, 
nonetheless, does not permit itself to be colonized — the final and 
unique limit of all philosophical knowledge.
The manifestation of this Earth, a testimony to the absolute Oth-
er that haunts thought, is still bound to a theophanic horizon: to 
a unique Earth corresponds a unique, catastrophic revelation, with-
out remains, that will transform every earthling into an inhabitant 
of an age where any distinction between near and far, neighbors 
and foreigners, has become invalid. An age, to say it in the words 
of Günther Anders, wherein “we are all proximi” (1962: 495). Just 
as the Western imagery of the “ecological crisis” has erased the co-
lonial reality, there seems to be a persistent colonial arrogance on 
the part of the current generation of “collapsonauts” 6 in referring 
to a unique world catastrophe, without borders, without differences.
If conceived as an ultimate and unique limit, Earth can only be 
archaic. This archaic, monumental Earth emerges from the moment 
when there is no longer any orientation for what is materially pos-
sible, thus, in the disorientation with respect to a unique abstract 
horizon for human praxis. However, this collapse of a given world can 
also give rise, instead, to what Badiou called an inexistant, something 
that is not possible within the world — where “world” designates the 
logic of its own appearing. This inexistent is not a hidden reserve of 
the existent for it cannot exist in one world; rather, it exposes us, 
6 For Yves Citton, we are part of the “Générations collapsonautes,” living in an 
epoch where everything tells us that our lifestyles are doomed to a coming collapse 
(Citton and Rasmi 2020).
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against the catastrophic finitude imposed by “democratic material-
ism” (Badiou 2009: 511), to the infinity of worlds.7
We are therefore summoned to think an-archically, of other earths. 
The earth has never existed, for the conditions of its existence are 
undefinable, though not unthinkable. As we argued, the unthink-
able has been represented by twentieth-century philosophy — in the 
most diverse possible forms — as the domain that could no longer 
be thought by thought, as the hidden or even absent ground that 
paradoxically constitutes the arché of any reality. In this way, the 
traditional Platonic figure of anamnesis has been revitalized in the 
paradoxical form of an endless remembrance of this forgetfulness. 
But the fact that the earth’s materiality is resistant to our intelligible 
faculties seems to suggest that the immaterial is precisely what is 
untouchable, unavailable (as well as immundus), while matter is the 
impenetrable limit that marks the point at which there is no longer 
anything to penetrate. It is the depth of something that does not 
refer to anything else, but interrupts the series of references, the 
chain of meanings and information. Within this perspective, mate-
rialist thought is a long history of encounters and dispossessions.8 
It is not a question of recovering any foundation, nor of expect-
ing any other, future beginnings: we have to assume that thought 
is, as Nietzsche realized, heterogenous, nourished by many sourc-
es, dis-integrated beyond recognition by the past and its victims.
Deleuze writes in his Desert Islands that “in the ideal of beginning 
anew there is something that precedes the beginning itself, that 
takes it up to deepen it and delay it in the passage of time” (2003: 
14). Even the Occident, faithful to its own beginning and stable in 
its own decline, is not a uniform territory. Innumerable are the paths 
of the earth that have never been taken.
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